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WAIVING FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ORIGINAL
ACTIONS BETWEEN STATES
Sandra B. Zellmer∗

ABSTRACT
There are tremendous disparities between high stakes original actions between
states before the U.S. Supreme Court, where there is no waiver of federal sovereign
immunity, and other types of cases in the lower courts, where a plethora of
immunity waivers allow states and other parties to seek relief from the federal
government for Fifth Amendment takings, unlawful agency action, and tort
claims. Federal actions or omissions are often at the heart of the dispute, and
federal involvement may be crucial for purposes of providing an equitable remedy
to the state parties, but there is no reliable mechanism for bringing the federal
government to an original action before the Supreme Court. This Article shows
how federal sovereign immunity stands in the way of comprehensive resolution of
interstate water rights and highlights the need for reforms to facilitate meaningful
participation by the United States. In particular, it investigates the merits of a
waiver of federal sovereign immunity in original actions between the states.
Although federal immunity is a staple of our nation’s jurisprudence, it has no
constitutional basis and it serves little purpose in this context. The Article
concludes that a congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity would be
appropriate and would have few downsides, at least in the case of original actions
between states before the U.S. Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article investigates the adverse consequences of federal
sovereign immunity in original actions between states in the U.S.
Supreme Court, where there is no federal immunity waiver despite
extensive federal involvement in the underlying dispute. By contrast, states and other aggrieved parties can invoke immunity waivers for regulatory and takings claims against the federal government in the lower courts and on petitions for certiorari. Federal
immunity in high stakes litigation between states imposes a perverse disincentive for states to seek relief from the highest court in
the land, and forces them to litigate their grievances in a piecemeal fashion in the lower courts. The inconsistent and unpredictable role of the federal government in original actions before the
U.S. Supreme Court poses “the legal equivalent of asymmetrical
warfare.” 1 To eradicate this disincentive and to stimulate comprehensive resolution of interstate battles over one of the world’s most
precious resources—water—this Article recommends a congressional waiver of federal immunity for original actions between
states.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is deeply entrenched in
American jurisprudence, yet federal sovereign immunity is not ex-

1.
Burke W. Griggs, Interstate Water Litigation in the West: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, 20 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 153, 211 (2017).
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plicitly required by the U.S. Constitution. While there may be
good reasons for shielding state governments from litigation by
aggrieved individuals, shielding the federal government from suit,
and especially in original actions between states in the U.S. Supreme Court, is less defensible.
Congress has waived federal immunity in several important contexts without destroying the balance of powers or the federal treasury. It has authorized claims against the federal government for
Fifth Amendment takings of private property, for tort claims, and
for final agency actions. Also, to facilitate comprehensive resolution of water rights, Congress has waived federal immunity in general stream adjudications in state court. Perversely, there is no such
waiver for original actions in the U.S. Supreme Court. When states
seek equitable apportionment or enforcement of interstate compacts, the United States can and often does sit on the sidelines, despite being a necessary party to the litigation.
Disputes over interstate water bodies provide a compelling context to explore the dimensions and consequences of federal sovereign immunity in original actions. The twentieth century saw an
explosion of federal involvement in water management throughout the nation, from reclamation to flood control and beyond,
heightening the potential for combat between federal and state
governments. Of the 88,000 inventoried dams in the country, federal agencies operate the largest, including the Hoover, Grand
Coulee, and Bonneville Dams. Meanwhile, nearly 30,000 miles of
federal levees armor the nation’s riverbanks and coastlines. 3
A federal agency’s decisions in operating its dams, reservoirs,
navigational channels, and related infrastructure may obstruct
comprehensive adjudications of states’ rights on transboundary water bodies, not because of any actual conflict with federal objectives, but because the agency refuses to participate or to be bound
4
in original action litigation. As a consequence, on many river systems, leaving the federal players out of the mix will allow upstream
states to exceed their fair share of a resource, simply because of the
federal presence in the basin. The nationwide implications are
enormous. Given the number of federal dams situated all across

2.
See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Waivers of Immunity and Congress’s Power to Regulate Federal
Jurisdiction-Federal-Tort Filing Periods as a Testing Case, 39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 243, 258 (2015)
(referencing Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29–30 (1926)).
3. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD: LEVEES 2
(2017), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/LeveesFinal.pdf.
4.
See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Can a State’s Water Rights Be Damned? Environmental Flows
and Federal Dams in the Supreme Court, 8 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 371 (2019).
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the nation, equitable apportionment may be a pipe dream on most
interstate rivers.
Although Congress has charged federal agencies with an array of
statutory flood control, reclamation, and navigation responsibilities, and has provided substantial appropriations for those purposes, it has done very little to facilitate the resolution of intergovernmental disputes. Intergovernmental conflict arises when federal
actions interfere with state-sanctioned private property rights or
with state regulation and control of water, an area purported to be
5
within the states’ traditional authorities. The management of
transboundary water supplies on major river systems generates uncertainty and conflict between states, water users, environmental
interests, and the federal government. Finding a forum that can
provide meaningful relief presents its own unique set of challenges. In the past few decades, jurisdictional battles over interstate water bodies seem to have grown immune to resolution. Sovereign
immunity and federalism are at the heart of the problem.
Part I of this Article considers the nature of original actions between the states before the U.S. Supreme Court under Article III, §
2, which authorizes a limited set of claims that would be difficult if
not impossible to resolve absent Supreme Court involvement. 6 Part
I also investigates the underpinnings of federal sovereign immunity. Separation of powers suggests that the government may need to
insulate itself from liability to individuals for policy decisions that
affect the public at large, which should be left to the political process rather than the judiciary. Critics of sovereign immunity point
out, however, that immunity contradicts democratic principles by
placing the government above the people, thereby “thwart[ing]
7
the administration of justice.” In some circumstances, Congress
has alleviated this injustice through waivers of immunity that authorize claims against the federal government for takings of private
property, unlawful or arbitrary agency action, torts, and several
other types of claims. It has not, however, waived federal immunity
for original actions in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Article then turns to several river basins across the nation to
tease out the jurisdictional quandaries posed by federal involvement, or lack thereof, in interstate water allocation and dispute
resolution. The basins of interest are situated within three distinct
5.
Cf. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242 (noting that states “have
jealously guarded their water allocation authority against real or imagined federal interference, and the federal government has largely (though not entirely) let them make their own
decisions regarding water rights”).
6.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
7.
Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002).
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but related contexts. Part II of the Article examines original actions for equitable apportionment between states over the Arkansas River and the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
(ACF). Next, Part III covers interstate compact litigation on the
Republican and Rio Grande Rivers. These two Parts demonstrate
how federal immunity for original actions obstructs comprehensive
resolution of interstate controversies. With respect to water rights,
the absence of a federal immunity waiver for original actions incentivizes states to sue in district court instead of bringing an original action or, for that matter, negotiating an interstate compact
that may be litigated before the Supreme Court.
The paradox posed by congressional waivers of federal immunity
for litigation in the lower courts is illustrated in Part IV. This Part
explores basins that have been subject to general stream adjudications (GSAs) as well as other basins that have been beleaguered by
regulatory and takings litigation in the lower courts. Part IV shows
how states and other interested parties have sought and obtained
relief from the federal government in the Milk, the Missouri, the
Platte, and the Klamath River Basins through immunity waivers
provided in the McCarran Amendment, 8 the Tucker Act, 9 the Ad10
11
ministrative Procedure Act, and federal environmental statutes.
Part V lays out two potentially viable solutions to the federal sovereign immunity problem. First, the executive branch, through the
Department of Justice, could encourage immunity waivers on a
case-by-case basis. This notion is unsatisfactory because any solution that relies on discretionary immunity waivers would lead to
uncertainty among the parties and unpredictable, possibly inequitable, results. A more effective pathway would be a congressional
waiver of federal sovereign immunity for water allocation original
actions between states. The waiver should apply regardless of
whether the cases originate as compact disputes or equitable apportionment litigation. Although pushing legislation through
Congress is a big ask, this particular legislative proposal may not be
terribly controversial. States would likely support it, and the federal
government would seemingly have little reason to oppose it.
The Article concludes by promoting the merits of a waiver of
federal immunity in original actions between the states. Although
sovereign immunity is a staple of our nation’s jurisprudence, it
serves little purpose in this context. A congressional waiver of federal immunity would foster more predictable and productive par8.
9.
10.
11.

43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2018).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2018).
5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2018).
See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018).
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ticipation by the United States in high stakes disputes over transboundary resources and would have few downsides, at least in the
case of interstate disputes before the U.S. Supreme Court.
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ORIGINAL ACTIONS

In one of the earliest tests of judicial power—Marbury v. Madison—the Supreme Court recognized that the law’s capacity to provide a remedy for violations of rights is the “essence of civil liber12
ty.” If one accepts that premise, then sovereign immunity is probproblematic. Why should governments be shielded from suits by
those who have been wronged by their actions or omissions? The
Framers said nothing explicit about sovereign immunity in the U.S.
Constitution, although the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment immunized the states from suits “by citizens of another state,
13
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”
What happens when a state invokes the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to sue a sister state over interstate water rights,
boundary lines, or other high stakes disputes? And what if complete relief cannot be provided unless the federal government participates as a party and can be bound by the Court’s order? This
Part considers the nature of original actions before the Supreme
Court to demonstrate the need for immunity waivers when sovereigns sue each other. It then draws distinctions between state and
federal sovereign immunity and, finally, assesses waivers of federal
immunity that provide relief to those who seek redress from the
United States in the lower courts.
A. Original Actions Between Sovereigns
Article III, § 2 gives the U.S. Supreme Court original 14 and ex15
clusive jurisdiction over cases brought by a state against another
12.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); accord R.R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 339 (1879) (“Adjudication is of no value as a remedy unless enforcement
follows.”).
13.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction.”). The Court also has original jurisdiction over controversies between the United States and a state and actions by a state against citizens of another state or
aliens. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018). However, disputes between states comprise the majority of
original actions heard by the Court. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
§ 10.2 (10th ed. 2013).
15.
See, e.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992); Texas v. New Mexico, 462
U.S. 554, 570 (1983) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982)).
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state. To invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, the state itself must be the
party of record, and the suit must be authorized by the governor or
16
another competent state official. The state must bring suit in its
17
capacity as the representative of its citizens, and it must assert
“quasi-sovereign” interests, rather than proprietary or individual
18
interests. In addition, original actions must be civil in nature, ra19
ther than penal, and they must involve a justiciable case or con20
troversy under Article III.
There are several reasons for these high jurisdictional bars. The
first, and most obvious, is to preserve the dignity of the highest
21
court of the land. Perhaps less apparent, but no less significant,
involves state sovereign immunity. When the action is brought by a
state in its sovereign capacity, the defendant state is not shielded by
immunity, as it would be if the suit were brought by an individual
22
or a foreign entity.
Even if all of the requisites are met, the Supreme Court can re23
fuse jurisdiction. In deciding whether to hear a case, the Court
considers the seriousness of the claim and the availability of an al24
ternative forum for resolution of the dispute. Among other
things, the Court will dismiss the complaint if it cannot fashion ap25
propriate relief.

16.
Florida v. Anderson, 91 U.S. 667 (1875).
17.
Id.
18.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976).
19.
See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888), overruled in part on other
grounds, Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (observing that, under
common law, the criminal laws of a sovereign do not reach beyond its own territory).
20.
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73 (1992).
21.
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1039 (2000).
22.
See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46 (1907).
23.
See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 113 (1906) (dismissing a suit by Kansas to
enjoin Colorado’s diversion of Arkansas River water because Kansas failed to prove that the
diversions caused substantial injury to Kansas); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906)
(dismissing Missouri’s nuisance claim against Illinois for lack of proof that Illinois’ sewage
discharges caused substantial injury to Missouri, explaining that not “every matter which
would warrant a resort to equity by one citizen against another . . . would warrant an interference by this court with the action of a State”); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309
(1921) (dismissing New York’s nuisance claim against New Jersey because New York failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the threatened invasion of its rights was of serious magnitude).
24.
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 796–797 (1976) (“[t]he question . . . concerns . . . the seriousness and dignity of the claim . . . [and] it necessarily involves the availability of another forum . . . .”).
25.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); see Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct.
2502, 2516 (2018); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 568–69 (1983) (rejecting New Mexico’s argument that the Court was powerless to hear a dispute over the Pecos River Compact
because the Compact Commission had exclusive jurisdiction: “[a]s New Mexico is the upstream State, with effective power to deny water altogether to Texas except under extreme
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Original proceedings are “basically equitable in nature,” in
which the Court may “mould the process . . . [to] best promote the
26
purposes of justice.” The exercise of original jurisdiction in litigation between states serves “‘as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between sovereigns and a possible resort
27
to force.’” Original jurisdiction is also designed to ensure that
federal law can be enforced effectively against the states, given the
28
constraints of state sovereign immunity. If it cannot obtain jurisdiction over a necessary party because of sovereign immunity or
otherwise, the Court cannot fashion appropriate relief, and it will
29
not accept jurisdiction. The pitfalls and virtues of state and federal sovereign immunity are examined in the next two Sections.
B. Shielding the Sovereign from Liability:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
For better or worse, sovereign immunity is deeply entrenched in
American jurisprudence. For the past 200 years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has adhered to the notion that the sovereign cannot be sued
30
without its consent. The Court has characterized the doctrine as
31
“universal” in the states at the time the Constitution was ratified.
Yet, among foundational doctrines of jurisprudence, none is more
hotly contested than sovereign immunity, and few have less solid
32
grounding in constitutional text. The history of the nation’s
founding helps fill in these foundational cracks.
Although they threw off the shackles of British rule, the colonies
hewed to the British common law notion that the King could do
no wrong—at least no wrong that could be remedied by private
33
lawsuits. In olden days, the only recourse British subjects had

flood conditions, the Commission’s failure to take action to enforce New Mexico’s obligations . . . would invariably work to New Mexico’s benefit. . . . [but] this Court would be powerless to grant Texas relief on its claim under the Compact.”).
26.
Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 453 (2015) (citations omitted); id. at 455 (“[The
Court] may invoke equitable principles, so long as consistent with the compact itself, to devise ‘fair . . . solution[s]’ to the state-parties disputes . . . .”) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. 124, 134 (1987)).
27.
Id. at 453 (citing North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372–373 (1923)).
28.
James Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases,
82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 559–60 (1994).
29.
Cf. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2514 (2018) (explaining that a state bears a
heightened initial burden of demonstrating that is has suffered a serious harm).
30.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821).
31.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999).
32.
Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 257.
33.
Id.
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34

against the crown was a petition of right. This cumbersome device
was “formal and ceremonious,” both to preserve the dignity of the
crown and to avoid “the absurdity of the King’s sending a writ to
35
himself to command the King to appear in the King’s Court.” If
the procedural barriers were overcome, however, the petition of
right provided an “efficient remedy for the invasion by the sover36
eign power of individual rights.”
In Federalist No. 81, Alexander Hamilton assured the colonies
that they would continue to be protected by immunity upon ratification of the Constitution: “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
37
consent.” However, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in 1882 in
United States v. Lee, “[a]s no person in this government exercises
supreme executive power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the
38
exemption from liability to suit rests.”
Whether it is a monarchy or a democracy, arguably, immunity
from suit protects the dignity of the sovereign and its courts,
which, through immunity, avoid being embroiled in political dis39
putes. This justification carries less weight, however, in a democracy, where the people are sovereign, and recourse to the courts is
a hallmark of participatory government. Instead, there may be
other reasons for sovereign immunity that apply with full, or perhaps even greater, force in a democracy.
Arguments in favor of governmental immunity in a democracy
center both on the nature of democratic decision-making and the
balance of powers among the three branches of government. Absent sovereign immunity, “policy-making decisions by the democratic branches of government may be second-guessed and sub40
jected to chilling interference by the courts.” It should not be
easy for aggrieved individuals to defeat decisions made by the peo-

34.
See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (“[F]rom the time of Edward the
First until now the king of England was not suable . . . except where his consent had been
given on petition of right . . . .”).
35.
See id. at 205–06; Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“[T]here
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”).
36.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 205 (citing United States v. O’Keefe 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 178, 184
(1870)).
37.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
38.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 205 (1882); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Shifting the Balance of Power? The
Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (arguing that sovereign immunity places the government “above the
law”).
39.
Cf. Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 544 (2008).
40.
Id.
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ple through their elected officials. The government’s policy-based
decisions that affect the public at large are insulated from suit “because open-ended and unconstrained access to the courts by those
who object to governmental policies or actions could undermine
effective governance by the people through an electoral majori41
ty.” This rationale suggests, then, that sovereign immunity should
only shield government actions that are intimately tied to policy
42
determinations.
This leads us to an examination of the federal government’s
claim to immunity from suits by states and others. Some of the reasons for state sovereign immunity support federal immunity, but
some do not.
For one thing, the federal government has a duty to do justice to
the people, as “a pervasive constitutional norm, derivable from the
Declaration of Independence and from the Preamble to the Con43
stitution, as well as the due process clause.” States have duties to
their citizens, too, but there is no constitutional equivalent to the
Eleventh Amendment for the federal government. If anything, the
constitutional text weighs against federal immunity. By granting
power to the federal courts to hear “controversies to which the
United States shall be a party,” Article III seems to negate the idea
44
of federal immunity. However, in United States v. Lee, the Supreme
Court remarked that Article III “created a court in which it has authorized suits to be brought against the United States, but has limited such suits to those arising on contract, with a few unimportant
45
exceptions.”
In Lee, the Court looked beyond the constitutional text and engaged in a comparative analysis of Britain and the United States to
probe the lineage and nature of federal sovereign immunity. Not
surprisingly, it found that sovereignty looks very different in the
United States:
What were the reasons which forbid that the King should
be sued in his own court, and how do they apply to the political body corporate which we call the United States of
41.
Id. at 529.
42.
Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 268.
43.
Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 607–08 (2003).
44.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1–2 (stating that, other than for original jurisdiction
cases, the Supreme Court “shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions, and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make”); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating
inter alia that judicial power shall vest in “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (enumerating Congress’
power to “constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”).
45.
See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205–06 (1882).
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America? As regards the King, one reason given by the old
judges was the absurdity of the King’s sending a writ to
himself to command the King to appear in the King’s
court. No such reason exists in our government, as process runs
in the name of the President and may be served on the At46
torney General . . . .
It seems curious, then, that the Lee Court ultimately shielded the
federal government from suit in the United States, just as the
monarchy would be shielded by immunity in Britain. The Court
explained: “it would be inconsistent with the very idea of supreme
executive power, and would endanger the performance of the public duties of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a
matter of right, at the will of any citizen, and to submit to the judicial tribunals the control and disposition of his public property, his
instruments and means of carrying on his government in war and
47
in peace, and the money in his treasury.”
The Court concluded its comparative analysis with a metaphorical turn through the Queen’s garden, where the judiciary is naught
but a careful gardener:
Notwithstanding the progress which has been made since
the days of the Stuarts in stripping the crown of its powers
and prerogatives, it remains true to-day that the monarch is
looked upon with too much reverence to be subjected to
the demands of the law as ordinary persons are, and the
king-loving nation would be shocked at the spectacle of
their Queen being turned out of her pleasure-garden by a
writ of ejectment against the gardener. The crown remains
the fountain of honor, and the surroundings which give
dignity and majesty to its possessor are cherished and enforced all the more strictly because of the loss of real power
in the government. It is not to be expected, therefore, that
the courts will permit their process to disturb the possession of the crown by acting on its officers or agents. 48
Thus, the Court reasoned, “It seems most probable that [federal
sovereign immunity] has been adopted in our courts as a part of
the general doctrine of publicists, that the supreme power in every
46.
Id. at 206 (emphasis added); see John Paul Stevens, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND
WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 82 (2014) (arguing that sovereign immunity
may have made sense in England, where the monarchy ruled by divine right and punishment could be meted out only by God, but it has no place in the U.S.).
47.
106 U.S. at 206 (quoting Briggs v. The Light Boats, 11 Allen 162 (Mass. 1865)).
48.
Id. at 208.
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State, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of
courts of its own creation, to defend itself from assaults in those
49
courts.”
Since Lee, the Supreme Court has been untroubled by fine distinctions between state and federal sovereign immunity, having
consistently held that, like states, the federal government is im50
mune from suit unless it consents. It has also insisted that such
consent must come from legislation enacted by our democratically
51
elected Congress.
In addition to the reasons articulated in Lee, there are several
arguments that sovereign immunity has an important role to play
in a democratic government, both in terms of horizonal separation
of powers and vertical separation of powers.
With respect to horizonal separation of powers—the separation
between the three branches of the federal government—sovereign
immunity cabins the judiciary’s ability to substitute its judgment for
52
choices made by the elected branches. In a democratic society,
where political means of redressing wrongs and preserving the rule
of law are available, Gregory Sisk argues that “reserving to the sovereign the power to consent to suit against itself ultimately means
53
reserving the power to govern to the people.” Thus, rather than
detracting from it, sovereign immunity “bolsters popular sovereignty by restraining the legal elite from imposing their policy
preferences and by denying judges the power to evaluate the pru54
dence of the political choices made by the majority.” Sisk ultimately concludes that federal sovereign immunity has a legitimate
place in our jurisprudence. By his account, “federal sovereign im-

49.
Id. at 206. (“[T]he judicial department of this government follows the action of the
political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”).
50.
See Sisk, supra note 39, at 529. Constitutional claims are an exception to this rule. See
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Revealing Redundancy: The Tension Between Federal Sovereign Immunity and
Nonstatutory Review, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 77, 124 (2005) (discussing non-statutory review); see
also David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’s
Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L. J. 2481, 2507 (1998) (noting that “[C]ourts interpret
jurisdictional statutes to preserve constitutional claims unless Congress clearly and explicitly
expresses its intention to deny review of such claims.”).
51.
Sisk, supra note 39, at 529; see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212
(1980) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that
the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S.
436, 444 (1834) (“As the United States are not suable of common right, the party who institutes such suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of congress, or the court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over it.”).
52.
See Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899,
900 (2010) (“[F]ederal sovereign immunity . . . fortifies the separation of powers between
the political and judicial branches.”).
53.
Id. at 904.
54.
Id. at 905.
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munity fits comfortably with popular sovereignty, divided and diminished government power, and political accountability for pub55
lic officers.”
A related, but distinct, reason for federal sovereign immunity is
the need to protect the federal treasury, built by the public as a
whole, from attacks by individuals who would drain it for private
gain. Not only is this a fiscal concern; it is also a separation of pow56
ers concern, with significant implications for judicial power. Con57
gress has authority over appropriations. Courts “cannot compel
58
payments from the Treasury absent statutory authority.” Although
courts can enter judgments that will be satisfied from the treasury,
“in the absence of some form of legislative commitment in advance
to satisfy those judgments, entry of such a judgment may prove in59
efficacious.” Understandably, courts wish to avoid issuing judg60
ments that will not be enforced. To do otherwise would erode
61
public faith in the judiciary and, more broadly, the rule of law.
It is worth noting that a mere legal right or cause of action “is
not enough to guarantee judicial review on its own, nor is it suffi62
cient to guarantee an appropriate remedy, even if there is review.”
Despite appearances, “Marbury’s apparent promise of effective redress for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an
63
ironclad rule.” As for claims against the federal government, two
competing interests must be weighed: “the individual’s interest in
receiving compensation for a meritorious claim and society’s interest in maintaining democratic control over the allocation of lim64
ited public funds.”
In a democracy based on federalism, suits by states against the
federal government raise unique concerns. Vertical separation of
powers—i.e., federal supremacy—requires a degree of freedom
from the imposition of state prerogatives that could destroy congressional priorities and the federal instrumentalities established
65
to carry them out.

55.
Id. at 900.
56.
See Jackson, supra note 43, at 539.
57.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
58.
Jackson, supra note 43, at 539.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 540.
61.
See ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 216 (1988) (quoting a statement of Andrew Jackson about the Supreme Court’s ruling in Worchester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515 (1832): “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!”).
62.
Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 530 (2006).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court held that Maryland could
not tax the Bank of the United States because the state’s “power to
66
tax involves the power to destroy.” In addition to state taxation,
the United States is immune from state regulation that undermines
67
federal supremacy. For example, a federal agency “is under no
obligation to submit the plans and specifications to the State Engi68
neer for approval” of a proposed federal dam. Likewise, federal
agencies may take action to protect federal public lands and re69
sources from destruction despite prohibitory state regulations.
For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to pronounce
judgment on the merits of federal immunity across the board. The
critical point, examined further below, is that federal sovereign
immunity is palatable when waivers of immunity exist for constitutional wrongs and for other infractions committed by the government that are suitable for judicial—as opposed to purely political—resolution.
C. Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity
70

Beginning with the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887, Congress has allowed “a broad tapestry of [] judicial actions against the
71
federal government.” The Tucker Act authorizes contract claims
and takings claims against the United States in the Court of Feder72
al Claims. Until 1946, when Congress passed several others in order to effectuate the New Deal administrative state, it was the only
73
significant waiver of federal immunity. In addition to the Tucker
Act, two statutory waivers are most relevant to this analysis: the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Administrative Procedure

66.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 341 (1819); see also United States. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S.
720 (1982).
67.
See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 451 (1931) (“The United States may perform
its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a state.”).
68.
Id. at 451–52.
69.
See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928).
70.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2018); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215
(1983) (“Government liability in contract is viewed as perhaps the widest and most unequivocal waiver of federal immunity from suit.”) (internal quotations omitted).
71.
Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and
Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 603 (2003).
72.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2018). Previously, Congress had created the
Court of Claims and gave it limited authority to hear contract claims and certain other
claims against the U.S.. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
73.
David H. Rosenbloom, 1946: Framing a Lasting Congressional Response to the Administrative State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 174 (1998) (arguing that with the New Deal’s creation of
dozens of new federal agencies, “Congress was searching for means to maintain legislative
supremacy in the face of the growing strength of the Presidency lest it lose its constitutional
place in the Federal scheme.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Act (APA). The FTCA authorizes tort claims for compensatory
74
damages to be brought against the federal government, while the
APA authorizes claims for non-monetary relief to be brought
75
against federal agencies. For purposes of complex litigation over
water rights, a fourth provision—the McCarran Amendment of
76
1952—waives federal immunity for adjudications in state court.
This Part of the Article looks at each of these statutory waivers, as
well as waivers found in federal environmental statutes like the
ESA.
The Tucker Act authorizes suits against the federal government
founded “upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui77
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” In addition to contract claims, the U.S. Supreme Court has construed this provision
as a waiver of immunity for claims seeking compensation for Fifth
78
Amendment takings. Gregory Sisk characterizes the Tucker Act as
the “foundation stone” in the adjudication of monetary claims
against the United States, both because of its remarkable stability
over time and the breadth and depth of its implications for the
79
federal government and treasury.
When injured parties seek damages for torts committed by the
80
federal government, they may bring suit under the FTCA. The
FTCA grants federal district courts jurisdiction over monetary
claims against the United States for personal injury or property loss
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of federal employees, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable under the law of the place where the act or
81
omission occurred. While the FTCA has become the most comprehensive and commonly invoked waiver of federal sovereign
82
immunity, there are several broad exceptions. The statute bars
strict liability claims, claims for assault, libel, and misrepresenta83
tion, and claims for interference with contract. In addition, the
FTCA’s “discretionary function” exception preserves federal im-

74.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (2018).
75.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
76.
43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2018).
77.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018).
78.
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1980).
79.
Sisk, supra note 39 at 532; see id. at 524 (stating that “a money suit in the Court of
Federal Claims is the vehicle for a large category of important claims against the federal
government . . . .”).
80.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2018).
81.
Id. § 1346(b).
82.
Sisk, supra note 39, at 536.
83.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018).
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munity from liability based upon an employee’s “exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
84
or duty on the part of” the Government. The exception is intended to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
85
through the medium of an action in tort.” In the past two decades, it has become “[t]he most gaping and frequently litigated of
86
the FTCA’s exceptions . . . .”
For suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief instead of monetary damages, the APA waives sovereign immunity for challenges
87
to federal agency action. It authorizes claims that the government
has acted “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
88
immunity.” Prior to the APA, aggrieved plaintiffs could challenge
some federal actions through the back door, so to speak, by filing a
suit for injunctive relief against a federal officer who allegedly act89
ed outside the scope of their authority. However, if the officer
acted consistently with federal law, or if a judgment would operate
90
against the government itself, the suit would be dismissed. Under
the APA, any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review there91
of.” The APA waives immunity regardless of whether the agency
or officer “acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under
92
color of legal authority . . . .” Moreover, judgments issued under
93
the APA bind the federal government, not just the agency official.
APA litigation has become one of the most significant avenues for

84.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
85.
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988) (citing United States v.
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
86.
James R. Levine, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1541 (2000). It appears that the exception has been invoked to dismiss over 75% of FTCA claims brought in federal district court. Gretchen Callas, Overview of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 34 Energy and Min. L. Instit. § 9.02 (2013).
87.
5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2018).
88.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2018).
89.
See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Scalia’s Bargain, 77 OHIO ST. L. J. 1155, 1159–60 (2016) (explaining that “if the officer acted ultra vires, he did not act ‘on behalf of the sovereign and
hence, is not protected by sovereign immunity.’”). This theory is similar to Ex Parte Young
doctrine, which allows suits against state officials for prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief. Id. at 1159 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
90.
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621 (1963).
91.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
92.
Id. § 702; see Kovacs, supra note 89, at 1194 (tracing the evolution of the APA’s waiver of federal immunity and arguing that ongoing “doctrinal confusion about the availability
of relief under the APA imposes costs on the government and potential plaintiffs”).
93.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
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obtaining relief against federal agencies, including those in charge
94
of federal dams and other infrastructure.
More specifically, with respect to resource management and allocation, Congress has provided discrete waivers of federal immun95
ity in a variety of modern environmental statutes. Although waivers in federal environmental laws have become “increasingly broad
and inclusive,” Congress has never enacted a general waiver for environmental regulations, and there appears to be no coherent
96
congressional policy for the waivers that have been adopted. As a
practical matter, “[i]f achieving environmental goals are worth
forcing individuals and companies to bear the cost of complying
with environmental standards, government agencies should also
97
bear those costs in carrying out their activities.” Congress has
minimized the risk of discriminatory enforcement and has protected federal agencies from bearing a disproportionate share of the
cost of compliance by treating federal agencies and facilities the
98
same as other regulated “persons.” By requiring federal agencies
to comply with permit requirements imposed by states that have
assumed the responsibility of implementing federal environmental
laws, immunity waivers level the playing field between agencies and
99
other regulated entities.
When it comes to water rights, Congress adopted a significant
waiver of sovereign immunity in the McCarran Amendment of
1952, which permits the United States to be joined in “in any
suit [] for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
100
system or other source . . . .”
Remarkably, the McCarran
Amendment waives federal immunity for general stream adjudica101
tions (GSAs) in state court. Congress was concerned that the
United States had been acquiring an ever-increasing number of
state law water rights, while refusing to participate in state court

94.
Sisk, supra note 39, at 540.
95.
Id.; see also Kenneth M. Murchison, Waivers of Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes of the Twenty-First Century: Correcting a Confusing Mess, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 359, 389 (2008).
96.
Murchison, supra note 95, at 362. The disparate nature of federal environmental
waivers may be attributed, in part, to institutional factors. There are nearly a dozen different
congressional committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over environmental and resource-related matters. Id. at 394–95.
97.
Id. at 394.
98.
Id.; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–66 (1997) (stating that the ESA’s
provision that “any person” may sue is “an authorization of remarkable breadth,” and refusing to dismiss claims against the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation); Schoeffler v. Kempthorne,
493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (W.D. La. 2007) (holding that the ESA’s citizen suit provision
waives federal sovereign immunity) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(c) (2006)).
99.
Murchison, supra note 95, at 394–96.
100.
43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2018).
101.
Id. § 666(a)
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proceedings to either adjudicate or administer those rights. As
the federal government’s footprint grew in river basins all across
the American West, water users became alarmed that federal sovereign immunity would prevent state courts from administering
state water law, causing the “the years of building the water laws of
the Western States in the earnest endeavor . . . to effect honest, fair
and equitable division of the public waters . . . [to] be seriously
103
jeopardized.’” The Senate Report for the McCarran Amendment
opines that “all water users on a stream, in practically every case,
are interested and necessary parties to any court proceed104
ings . . . .” Since the passage of the Amendment, there have only
been a dozen or so state court adjudications of federal reserved wa105
ter rights.
Congress has not always been so open-minded when it comes to
waivers of sovereign immunity. In the McCarran Amendment itself,
Congress refused to waive federal immunity for “the joinder of the
United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of
the United States involving the right of States to the use of the wa106
ter of any interstate stream.” This reinforces the limited nature of
McCarran’s authorization for GSAs in state courts, and reflects
congressional deference to state laws and procedures related to water allocation: “Congress was most careful not to upset, in any way,
107
the irrigation and water laws of the Western States.”
In the context of federal water management, Congress was especially stingy about exposing the federal government to liability
108
when it passed the Flood Control Act. That Act states, “No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
109
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.” The Supreme Court construed the terms of this provision expansively in
110
United States v. James. There, the Court found that the Act barred
102.
Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely, The Legislative History of the McCarran Amendment: An Effort
to Determine Whether Congress Intended for State Court Jurisdiction to Extend to Indian Reserved Water Rights, 46 ENVTL. L. 845 (2016).
103.
Id. at 883 (citing S. Rep. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951)).
104.
Id. at 860 (citing S. Rep. No. 82-755, at 4–5) (emphasis added).
105.
See, e.g., United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 3 (1993); United States v. Dist. Court In
& For Eagle City, Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971) (holding that the Amendment reaches
appropriative rights, riparian rights, and federal reserved rights). For commentary, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell, General Stream Adjudications, The McCarran Amendment, and Reserved Water Rights, 15 WYO. L. REV. 313 (2015); John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating River and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355 (2005); John E. Thorson
et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 299 (2006).
106.
43 U.S.C. § 666(c) (2018).
107.
S. Rep. No. 82-755, at 3 (1951).
108.
33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018).
109.
Id. § 702c (emphasis added).
110.
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
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wrongful death claims arising out of boating accidents on federal
reservoirs created for flood control but used extensively for recreational purposes: “the terms ‘flood’ and ‘flood waters’ apply to all
waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control pro111
ject for purposes of or related to flood control . . . .” The Court
added, “Congress’ choice of the language ‘any damage’ and ‘liability of any kind’ further undercuts a narrow construction” of this
112
immunity provision.
The Supreme Court subsequently disavowed the dicta of James
that may have immunized projects merely “related to flood con113
trol.” It clarified: “the statute directs us to determine the scope of
the immunity conferred, not by the character of the federal project
or the purposes it serves, but by the character of the waters that
cause the relevant damage and the purposes behind their re114
lease.” If “flood waters” caused the harm, the government enjoys
statutory immunity from tort claims for both property damage and
115
personal injury under the FCA. If the FCA is inapplicable, the
courts must look to other sources of federal law to determine
whether sovereign immunity is intact or, conversely, whether Con116
gress has consented to suit.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE WAR
THROUGH EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
Absent an interstate compact, state versus state disputes over the
allocation of water and other natural resources are subject to equi117
table apportionment by the U.S. Supreme Court. The United
States sometimes seeks to intervene in the dispute, but it frequently
sits on the sidelines, despite palpable federal interests and exten-

111.
Id. at 605.
112.
Id.; see also Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts & Background Principles, 52 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 193, 202 (2017).
113.
Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 430–31 (2001).
114.
Id. at 434 (“[T]o characterize every drop of water that flows through that immense
project as ‘flood water’ simply because flood control is among the purposes served by the
project unnecessarily dilutes the language of the statute.”).
115.
Id.; James, 478 U.S. at 608.
116.
See Ark. Fish & Game Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (allowing state
agency to sue the United States for takings); infra Part IV (assessing claims against the U.S.
for damages and injunctive relief arising out of its river-related operations under the Fifth
Amendment, the APA, and the ESA).
117.
See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 619 (2013); supra Part I.A
(discussing original actions under Art. III). Equitable apportionment is a federal common
law doctrine that allocates competing states’ rights to use interstate waters and other natural
resources. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143–44 (1902).

466

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:2

118

sive federal involvement in water management. This Part of our
interstate odyssey navigates original actions between the states over
the waters of the Arkansas River and the ACF.
A. The Arkansas River: Kansas v. Colorado
In 1902, Kansas brought an original action against Colorado for
allegedly taking more than its fair share of the Arkansas River. Kan119
sas v. Colorado forced the Supreme Court to grapple with the
immutable forces of geography and gravity and to conclude that
equitable apportionment must be a necessary outgrowth of federal
common law. The Court asked whether an upstream State can appropriate all water from a river, thus “wholly depriv[ing]” a downstream State “of the benefit of water” that “by nature” would flow
120
into its territory. The Court pointed out that in such a circumstance, the downstream State lacks the sovereign’s usual power to
respond—the capacity to make war, or even enter into agreements
121
without the consent of Congress.
The Court observed that, “[b]ound hand and foot by the prohibitions of the Constitution, . . . the judicial power is the only means
left” to the downstream state, who must come straight to the top—
122
the highest court in the land—to seek equity. After further factual development, the Court issued an order in 1907 dismissing Kansas’s complaint for failure to show substantial harm from Colorado’s withdrawals, while recognizing Kansas’s right to institute new
proceedings if it could show that Colorado’s actions were destroying “the equitable apportionment of benefits between the two
123
states resulting from the flow of the river.” Since then, the Court
has issued only a scant handful of equitable apportionment de124
crees.
The United States sought to intervene in the dispute, claiming a
“superior right . . . to control the whole system of the reclamation

118.
Cf. Rhett B. Larson, Interstitial Federalism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 908, 918 (2015) (describing the management of shared water resources “under the cloud of interjurisdictional politics” as “one of the most formidable governance challenges in the United States”).
119.
185 U.S. 125.
120. Id. at 143–45.
121.
Id. at 143–44.
122.
Id. at 144.
123.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117–18 (1907).
124.
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence
Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 173 (2003) (listing the Laramie River,
the Delaware River, and the North Platte River); cf. Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983)
(extending the doctrine to anadromous fish).
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of arid lands.” It urged the Court to adopt prior appropriation to
resolve the controversy, arguing “[t]hat the doctrine of riparian
rights . . . would prevent the sale, reclamation, and cultivation of
the public arid lands, and defeat the policy of the government in
126
respect thereto.” The Court rejected the notion that the United
States had a “superior right” in water apportionment and denied
its motion to intervene, without prejudice to any future action by
the United States if necessary to maintain or improve navigabil127
ity. Kansas v. Colorado represents a rare example of the United
States attempting to engage in an equitable apportionment and
being flatly rejected by the Court.
B. The ACF: Florida and Alabama v. Georgia
States that follow riparian water law are not immune to battles
over transboundary waters. As a case in point, Georgia and Florida
128
have been fighting over the ACF for decades. The downstream
states, in particular, Florida, seek to ensure adequate flows to protect both the ecosystem and the oyster fishery in the Apalachicola
River and its estuary. The leading antagonist—Georgia—uses water
for the megalopolis of Atlanta and for irrigation. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, which manages upstream dams for hydropower, water supply, and recreation, is a key player but, oddly enough,
129
is not a party to the original action in the Supreme Court.
In addition to mounting litigation worthy of a Charles Dickens
130
novel, the states have also attempted to reach an agreement. In
1997, Congress approved the ACF Compact, which committed the
states to negotiate and to develop an allocation formula for the wa131
ters of the basin. The Compact Commission was composed of the
governors of the three states, but instead of making the Corps a full
132
partner, it included a non-voting federal representative. When

125.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 87.
126.
Id. at 87.
127.
Id. at 87, 117. The Court noted that the federal government has superior rights to
control navigation but not reclamation. Id. at 92–94 (citing Act of June 17, 1902, sec. 8, 32
Stat. 388).
128.
Heather Elliott, The Court’s Original Jurisdiction Doctrine Discriminates Against Downstream States, ABA 37 WATER L. CONFERENCE 5–6 (Mar. 26, 2019). Alabama has been involved, too, but in a more tangential way than Georgia and Florida. Id.
129.
Benson, supra note 4, at 391.
130.
Bleak House comes to mind. For a run-down of the ACF litigation history against the
Corps, see In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1174–78 (11th Cir.
2011).
131.
See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111
Stat. 2219 (1997).
132.
Id.
TH
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the states failed to adopt an equitable allocation formula, the Com133
pact lapsed in 2003.
On major river systems like the ACF, the Corps develops “master
134
manuals” to coordinate the operations of its projects. A proposed
revision to the ACF manual spawned years of litigation, during
which the Corps steadfastly maintained that it had no authority to
supply water to Atlanta from Lake Lanier, its second largest reser135
voir in Georgia. When the Eleventh Circuit determined that water supply was a congressionally authorized purpose, the Corps issued a new ACF manual in 2017, allocating over a quarter million
136
acre-feet of Lake Lanier water for use in Georgia.
Meanwhile, Florida sought an equitable apportionment from
the Supreme Court, alleging that Georgia’s consumption of water
had significantly reduced flows in the Apalachicola, causing harm
137
to the estuary and the collapse of its oyster beds. Georgia’s response was twofold. First, according to Georgia, Florida suffered no
significant harm that would rise to a level requiring Supreme
Court involvement. Moreover, to the extent there was harm, it was
caused by the Corps’ projects, not by Georgia’s water uses, thus the
138
United States was a necessary party. In either event, Georgia said,
139
the suit must be dismissed.
The special master found that Florida had suffered harm from
decreased flows, and that the oyster fishery had experienced “un140
precedented collapse” in the 2012 drought. His report pointed
to Georgia’s “remarkably ineffective” approach to its internal man141
agement of irrigation water as a source of Florida’s harm. Although Georgia had taken steps to conserve water for municipal
and industrial purposes in Atlanta, it had failed to implement a
state statute designed to reduce water use during droughts, and it
had continued to approve new water permits without limiting the
amount to be used in irrigation. In short, “Georgia’s position—

133.
In re: MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rts. Litig., 644 F.3d at 1175.
134.
Benson, supra note 4, at 392.
135.
In re: MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d at 1195.
136.
Id. at 1186–92.
137.
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2509 (2018).
138.
Id. at 2511. Necessary parties are those who have an interest in the subject matter of
the suit and whose rights may be materially affected by the judgment. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, if a necessary party cannot be joined but is indispensable to the
adequate and equitable resolution of the case, the court will not proceed to a final determination even as between parties who are before the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (2019); see also
Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (1985).
139.
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2511.
140.
Id. at 2512.
141.
Report of the Special Master at 33, Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (February 14,
2017) (No. 142).
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practically, politically, and legally—can be summarized as follows:
Georgia’s agricultural water use should be subject to no limita142
tions, regardless of the long-term consequences for the Basin.”
Even so, the special master recommended dismissal of Florida’s
case, based on his belief that the Supreme Court could not effectively remedy the harm without being able to bind the Corps: improved flows upstream might not benefit the Apalachicola during
dry seasons, based on the Corps’ ability to withhold more water
from its dams on the Chattahoochee and the operating protocols
provided in the Corps’ existing water control manual for its pro143
jects in the ACF Basin. The United States was deemed a necessary
and indispensable party but could not be joined because of sover144
eign immunity.
Fortunately for Florida, the Supreme Court disagreed, and denied Georgia’s motion to dismiss in a 5-4 decision, allowing Florida
145
to continue its quest for equitable apportionment. In doing so,
the Court found that the special master had erred by requiring
Florida to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the Court
146
would “be able to fashion an appropriate equitable decree.” According to the majority, at this stage of the proceeding Florida
need only establish a likelihood that the Court could issue a work147
able decree.
The evidentiary standard was only one point of contention. The
much larger concern was the Supreme Court’s power to order
changes in the Corps’ operations when the federal government was
not a party to the litigation. The majority believed that “a workable
decree would be possible despite the Corps’ ‘inherent discretion’
in operating its projects,” due to the Corps’ flexible protocols for
both drought and non-drought operations under the current ACF
148
Master Manual. Justice Thomas’s dissent, on the other hand, exhibited deep skepticism that the Corps would change its operations
if the Court capped Georgia’s water use in a decree that bound on149
ly the state parties but not the Corps. In other words, without the
150
Corps, Florida might win the lawsuit but still lose the water war.

142.
Id. at 34.
143.
See id. at 31.
144.
See id. at 30–31 (“The evidence does not provide sufficient certainty that an effective
remedy is available without the presence of the Corps as a party in this case.”).
145.
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2527 (2018).
146.
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2516.
147.
Id. at 2526–27.
148.
Benson, supra note 4, at 398.
149.
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2540.
150.
Id. As this Article went to press, the special master issued a new report, which, as
before, recommended dismissal of Florida’s complaint. He concluded that Florida had not
proven that Georgia’s consumption caused it harm, in part because the Corps had not exer-
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For its part, the United States, in its amicus brief, conceded that
the Corps would take a decree from the Court “into account and
151
adjust its operations accordingly,” and that such a decree “would
necessarily form part of the constellation of laws to be considered
152
by the Corps” in operating its ACF projects. In almost the same
breath, however, the brief voiced reservations as to whether the
Corps could (or would) provide higher releases to benefit Florida
153
“under its existing authorities.”
[U]nlike a compact among the States that is approved by
Congress or legislation altering the purposes of the ACF system, an apportionment by this Court in the form of a consumption cap would not formally bind the Corps to take any particular action because the United States is not a party to this
154
suit . . . .
Allowing the Corps to block equitable apportionment by sitting
on the sidelines of this original action creates perverse incentives.
Reed Benson explains, “the Corps’ operating decisions may be
found to preclude a workable decree; not because of any clear conflict with project purposes, but simply because the Corps will not
155
be bound and will choose not to change its practices.”
From the downstream states’ perspective, it seems wildly inequitable to allow Georgia to exceed its fair share of the ACF simply
156
because of the presence of federal dams in the basin. Beyond the
ACF, the nationwide implications are enormous. With the number
of federal dams situated all across the nation, equitable apportionment would be a pipe dream on most interstate rivers. As for
entering an interstate compact, an upstream state would have little
incentive to negotiate with a downstream state if it can defeat equi157
table apportionment simply by the presence of a federal dam.
Ironically, if this litigation were a general stream adjudication in
state court, the United States could be forced to join the proceedcised (and presumably would not exercise) “discretion to release significantly more water
than the minimums required by its operational rules.” Report of the Special Master, Florida
v. Georgia, No. 142, at 58 (Dec. 11, 2019). He added, “I do not reach the question whether
the Corps could make reasonable modifications to its Master Manual so that flows would
pass through to Florida during drought.” Id. at 61.
151.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overrule of Florida’s Exception 2C to the Report of the Special Master at 30, Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (Aug.
7, 2017) (No. 142).
152.
Id. at 32.
153.
Id. at 31.
154.
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
155.
Benson, supra note 4, at 404–05.
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at 37.
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ing—and be bound by it—under the McCarran Amendment.
This paradox is assessed below, along with similar phenomenon in
159
takings and regulatory cases.
III. ATTEMPTS AT PEACE-MAKING THROUGH
INTERSTATE COMPACTS

When states do wish to engage in cooperative action, the Compact Clause of Article I, § 10 provides that “[n]o State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or com160
pact with another state . . . .” Congressional consent serves to
“prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which
might affect injuriously the interests of the others,” and safeguards
161
against the infringement of federal interests. Upon consent, an
interstate compact, “like any other federal statute, becomes the law
of the land, having both public law (federal and interstate sover162
eignty) and private law (contract) implications.”
There are distinct parallels between interstate compact litigation
and equitable apportionment cases. Both are steeped in the “background notion that a State does not easily cede its sovereignty”
163
over water. And when push comes to shove, both wind up before
164
the Supreme Court. Each state’s right to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction “is an important part of the context” in which
165
compacts are made. Moreover, if a state decides to litigate over
compact compliance, the federal government plays an ambiguous
role, just as it does in equitable apportionment cases. In any original action between states, where the Court serves “‘as a substitute
for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between sovereigns
and a possible resort to force,’” it may “‘regulate and mould the
process it uses in such a manner as in its judgment will best pro166
mote the purposes of justice.’” With this unique authority and responsibility, the Court occasionally permits the United States to
participate in suits in order to defend “distinctively federal interests” that a normal litigant might not otherwise be allowed to pursue. Yet a generalized interest in interstate commerce will not do.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
1042).

See supra notes 100–107 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018) (quoting 58 U.S. 478 (1855)).
Id. (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)).
Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 631 (2013).
See e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015).
Id.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. at 958 (quoting Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. at
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“[J]ust because Congress enjoys a special role in approving interstate agreements, it does not necessarily follow that the United
States has blanket authority to intervene in cases concerning the
167
construction of those agreements.”
This Part illustrates these themes with a look at litigation over
the Rio Grande River Compact and the Republican River Compact. For contrast, it then considers two interstate-federal compacts. The Delaware River Compact is widely seen as a successful
compact, and the Missouri River Compact as a failure.
A. Rio Grande: Texas v. New Mexico
The Rio Grande originates in the Rockies and flows through
Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico, before emptying into
the Gulf of Mexico. The summer of 2001 marked the first time in
recorded history that the river failed to reach the Gulf. In 2018, it
168
barely made it to New Mexico. “Drained by farmers, divided by
treaty, feuded over in courtrooms and neglected when not
pumped and drained, the Rio Grande is at once one of America’s
169
most famous rivers and one of its most abused.”
In writing the unanimous opinion for the Court in Texas v. New
Mexico, Justice Gorsuch appears to have taken great delight in citing not the usual suspect in water wars—Mark Twain—but rather
Will Rogers, who reportedly called the Rio Grande “the only river I
170
ever saw that needed irrigation.” Justice Gorsuch described the
origins of the interstate and international agreements governing
the waters of the Rio Grande:
Like its namesake, the Rio Grande Compact took a long
and circuitous route to ratification. Its roots trace perhaps
to the 1890s, when Mexico complained to the United States
that increasing demands on the river upstream left little for
those below the border. The federal government responded by proposing, among other things, to build a reservoir

167.
Id. at 959.
168.
Richard Parker, The Rio Grande Is Dying. Does Anyone Care?, NY TIMES, Sept. 28, 2018.
169.
Id.
170.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. at 956. Will Rogers was a vaudeville performer, newspaper columnist, and cowboy who not only starred in dozens of films but also mounted a
mock campaign for the presidency as Life Magazine’s “Anti-Bunk” party candidate in 1928.
See The Official Website of Will Rogers, CMG WORLDWIDE, https://www.cmgww.com/
historic/rogers/about/biography/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
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and guarantee Mexico a regular and regulated release of
171
water.
In the wake of this agreement, the United States located a dam
site near Elephant Butte, New Mexico, about one hundred miles
north of the Texas state line, and agreed to deliver 60,000 acre-feet
172
of water annually to Mexico upon completion of the reservoir.
The project was completed in 1916 as part of the larger development known as the Rio Grande Project.
Meanwhile, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico, all of which
claim sovereign rights to the water, negotiated several agreements
in which the Rio Grande Project played a central role. In the first
set of agreements, the “Downstream Contracts,” the federal government promised to provide water from Elephant Butte Reservoir
to irrigation districts in New Mexico and Texas. In turn, the districts agreed to pay charges in proportion to their acreage—57%
for New Mexico and 43% for Texas.
Around the same time, the three states entered into the Rio
Grande Compact, which Congress approved in 1939. 173 The Compact required Colorado to deliver a specified amount of water to
New Mexico at the state line, and also directed New Mexico to deliver water to Elephant Butte, some of which would be delivered
downstream to Texas. As the Court noted, “[i]n isolation, this
might have seemed a curious choice, for a promise to deliver water
to a reservoir more than 100 miles inside New Mexico would seem174
ingly secure nothing for Texas.” Texas, however, had the Downstream Contracts’ guarantee that Texas’s water districts would receive a certain amount of water every year from the reservoir.
Fast forward to the present dispute. The Supreme Court granted
leave for Texas to file an original action to vet its complaint that
New Mexico breached its commitment to deliver water to Elephant
Butte by allowing downstream users to “siphon off” water below the
175
reservoir. The United States sought to intervene, and was allowed
176
to file a complaint with allegations that parallel Texas’s.
On New Mexico’s motion, the special master recommended
dismissal of the United States’ complaint, reasoning “the Compact
does not confer on the United States the power to enforce its

171.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. at 957.
172.
Id. (citing Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, 34 Stat. 2953).
173.
Rio Grande Compact, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785 (1939).
174.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. at 957–58.
175.
Id. at 957–58.
176.
Id. at 958.
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177

terms.” As in the ACF case, the Supreme Court rejected the special master’s recommendation, and allowed the United States to
stay in the game for four reasons. First, New Mexico conceded that
the United States plays an integral role in the Compact’s opera178
tion. Second, because it had assumed a legal responsibility to deliver water to Texas, the U.S. “might be said to serve, through the
Downstream Contracts, as a sort of ‘agent’ of the Compact,”
charged with assuring that the apportionment to Texas and New
179
Mexico “is, in fact, made.” Third, New Mexico’s failure to deliver
water to the reservoir “could directly impair the federal govern180
ment’s ability to perform its obligations under the treaty.” Final181
ly, the United States sought substantially the same relief as Texas.
The Court cautioned that, “[n]othing in our opinion should be
taken to suggest whether a different result would obtain in the absence of any of the considerations we have outlined or in the pres182
ence of additional, countervailing considerations.” Notably, if the
United States had not sought to intervene, important federal interests would have gone unheard and the states would not have
been able to obtain complete relief on one of America’s most fa183
mous—and most abused—rivers.
New Mexico precipitated Texas’s original action in the Supreme
Court by suing the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in federal district
court over its operating agreement for the Rio Grande Project.
New Mexico believed that the Bureau had given Texas too much
184
water. Only then did Texas initiate its original action, where New
Mexico tried—and failed—to limit the United States’ involvement.
Waivers of sovereign immunity that allow a state to sue a federal
agency in federal court are addressed below in Part IV.

177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 959 (“[T]he federal government is so integrally a part of the Compact’s operation that a State could sue the United States under the Compact for interfering with its operation.”). But see supra Part II.B (showing that this is by no means a forgone conclusion).
179.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. at 959.
180.
See id. at 959–60 (explaining that New Mexico’s breach could prevent the U.S. from
delivering water to Mexico from Elephant Butte).
181.
Id. at 960.
182.
Id.
183.
See Parker, supra note 168.
184.
See New Mexico v. U.S., No. CIV11-0691, 2013 WL 1657355 (D.N.M. Mar. 29, 2013)
(asserting APA, NEPA, and other claims). This litigation was stayed while the Supreme
Court considered Texas’ motion for leave to file its original action complaint. Id. at *6. I
thank Reed Benson for bringing this case to my attention.
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B. Republican River: Kansas v. Nebraska
The Dust Bowl of the 1930s brought an extended drought to the
185
Great Plains, including the Republican River Basin. As if water
scarcity were not hardship enough, the Republican River experi186
enced a deadly flood in 1935. These forces motivated the United
States to step up with a proposal to construct reservoirs to control
flooding, along with an array of irrigation projects to utilize the
stored water. Before it would commit resources, however, the
United States insisted that the states agree to an allocation of the
Basin’s water. After all, an interstate dispute over the Republican
between a Nebraska irrigation district and the state of Colorado
had already made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court once; adding
Kansas to the mix could only complicate things further if an
187
agreement were not reached in advance.
Fiercely determined to retain state control while securing federal resources for flood control and reclamation, the initial version
of the Compact characterized the Republican River as nonnavigable in hopes of neutralizing federal power within the basin.
Refusing to have federal interests short-circuited, President Roosevelt vetoed the initial agreement, and the states returned to the
188
negotiating table. Ultimately, they defined the respective state
189
and federal interests “in a satisfactory manner,” which paved the
190
way for enactment in 1943.
The Republican River Compact provides a percentage allocation
of the “virgin water supply originating in” the Basin to each of the
191
states—Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado. As used in the Compact, “virgin water supply” means “the water supply within the Ba-

185.
Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1049 (2015).
186.
Republican River Flood of 1935, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/
gld/1935flood-aftermath (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
187.
See Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922). The Court made it clear
that federal law applied to such disputes, which “necessarily rested, not upon Colorado laws
or decisions which attempted to deny the asserted right to the use of the water in Nebraska,
nor upon Nebraska laws or decisions which could not be effective in Colorado, but upon
rights secured to the appellee [irrigation district] by the Constitution of the United States.”
Id. at 502.
188.
Sandra Zellmer, Boom and Bust on the Great Plains: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 41
CREIGHTON L. REV. 385, 399 (2008) (citing 88 Cong. Rec. 3286 (1942)).
189.
Frank P. Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-Operative Federalism, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 825, 838 (1963).
190.
Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943). This paved the way for seven
Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs and one Corps of Engineers reservoir. Press Release, Reclamation, Republican River Basin Study Informs Colorado, Kansas and Nebraska (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=53087.
191.
Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, art. III (1943) (dividing the water
supply between Nebraska (49%), Kansas (40%), and Colorado (11%)).
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sin,” in both the River and its tributaries, “undepleted by the activi192
ties of man.”
When Kansas experienced a shortfall in the late 1990s it brought
an original action, alleging that it had been harmed by groundwater pumping from hydraulically connected wells upstream in Ne193
braska. The states entered into a settlement in 2002, with the
understanding that Nebraska would significantly reduce its consumption of Republican River water from both surface and
groundwater sources. The settlement’s adoption of multi-year averages to measure consumption allowed Nebraska some time to
come into compliance. As it turned out, Nebraska came up “mark194
edly short.”
In 2015, the Supreme Court ordered Nebraska to disgorge $1.8
million, representing the portion of Nebraska’s gain from its
breach of the Compact through its consumption of 17% more wa195
ter than its proper share. However, Kansas did not get everything
it wanted. In a bold move, the Court authorized amendment of the
settlement agreement’s accounting procedures, which had
charged Nebraska for using water that it had imported to the Republican from the Platte River Basin. Otherwise, the Court remarked, Nebraska’s consumption of Platte River water would be
unjustly counted against its Republican River Compact alloca196
tion. It justified the amendment with reference to its inherent
authority to devise “fair and equitable solutions” to interstate water
disputes. According to the Court, it was merely “modifying a technical agreement to . . . align it with the compacting States’ intend197
ed apportionment.”
The Court emphasized that, when negotiating an interstate
compact, states bargain for their rights “in the shadow” of the
Court’s equitable apportionment power—that is, its capacity to
198
prevent one state from taking advantage of another. As such,
even in compact litigation, the Court will “invoke equitable principles, so long as consistent with the compact itself, to devise ‘fair . . .

192.
Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1049 (2015) (citing Republican River Compact,
ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, art. II).
193.
Id. at 1049 (citing Bill of Complaint, O.T. 1997, No. 126, Orig., p. 5 (May 26,
1998)).
194.
Id. at 1054.
195.
Id. at 1053–1054.
196.
Id. at 1063.
197.
Id. at 1062 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134); cf. Kansas v. Colorado,
543 U.S. 86, 102 (“After all, a ‘credit’ for surplus water that rests upon inaccurate measurement is not really a credit at all.”) (emphasis in original)).
198.
Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015).
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solution[s]’ to the state-parties’ disputes and provide effective re199
lief for their violations.”
By imbuing compacts with equitable principles, the latter part of
the opinion causes consternation for states seeking to maintain a
wall between literal enforcement of compact provisions and less
200
certain, more transformative equitable principles. It certainly was
for Justice Thomas. In his dissent, Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia
and Alito, with Chief Justice Roberts joining in pertinent part, insisted that the majority had invented a new theory of compact
reformation. He argued that the majority improperly inflated its
201
equitable powers to construe—and reform—compact terms. Invoking state sovereignty, Justice Thomas wrote:
The States’ “power to control navigation, fishing, and other
public uses of water” is not a function of a federal regulatory program; it “is an essential attribute of [state] sovereignty.” Thus, when the Court resolves an interstate water dispute, it deals with . . . pre-existing sovereign rights. . . . AuAuthority over water is a core attribute of state sovereignty,
and “[f]ederal courts should pause before using their inherent equitable powers to intrude into the proper sphere
of the States.” 202
According to the majority, however, the Court’s “equitable authority to grant remedies is at its apex” in cases like this, “when
203
public rights and obligations are thus implicated.” Importantly,
in contrast to the Rio Grande litigation, the Court could grant a
meaningful remedy without drawing the United States into the
fray, largely because the Republican River shortages were caused
204
by groundwater pumping and not federal reservoir operations.
This saga turns inward at this juncture, where, ironically, the
federal government became embroiled in an intrastate battle within Nebraska. The state’s forecasts for 2013 and 2014 indicated that,
once again, its consumption would exceed its Compact allocation,

199.
Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S at 134 (supplying an “additional enforcement mechanism” to ensure an upstream state’s compliance with a compact)).
200.
Id. at 1066–67 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
201.
Id. at 1066.
202.
Id. at 1067 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 131 (1995)).
203.
See id. at 1062–63. The Court also opined that the Accounting Procedures adopted
in the settlement would violate the Compact by reaching beyond the Compact’s geographic
boundaries, i.e., the “virgin water supply originating in” the Republican River Basin. Id. at
1062. The Compact, the majority explained, “is the supreme law in this case: As the States
explicitly recognized, they could not change the Compact’s terms even if they tried.” Id.
204.
See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text (addressing the Court’s reasons for
allowing the U.S. to lodge its complaint).
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so the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources sent closing notices to permit holders in the Republican River Basin. Several appropriators, representing irrigators within the FrenchmanCambridge Irrigation District (FCID), filed lawsuits against both
205
the United States and the state. First, the appropriators sought
an injunction to stop the Bureau of Reclamation from interfering
206
with their water rights. This novel theory quickly failed for an inability “to show an unequivocal waiver of the United States’ sover207
eign immunity.” Alternatively, the allegation that the Bureau had
breached a duty “by failing to sue the state of Nebraska in order to
prevent curtailment of water rights by state authorities” was dis208
missed for failure to state a cognizable claim.
Federal interests were only indirectly involved in the second law209
suit of note, Hill v. State. There, Nebraska appropriators alleged
both regulatory and physical takings claims against the State of
210
Nebraska for taking their water and giving it to Kansas. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected these claims. Citing Kansas v. Ne211
braska, the court ruled that allocations under the Republican
River Compact are the “supreme law in Nebraska,” and that any intrastate rights to use the water are subject to the state’s superior
obligation to ensure Compact compliance. Because Compact apportionment “is binding upon the citizens of each State and all water claimants, . . . the apportionment made by the [c]ompact can212
not have taken . . . any vested right.”
In the end, the interstate compact cases and their intrastate
progeny illustrate two related points. First, state water rights yield
to interstate compacts, whatever the forum. By the same token,
federal interests may be sidelined while inter- and intrastate rights
are reconciled. On the Republican, irrigators wanted to compel
federal involvement and were rejected, probably for good reason,
as the states worked out their issues over groundwater pumping
without the Bureau (which manages surface water impoundments), but, ultimately, with Compact reformation by the U.S. Su-

205.
Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation Dist. v. Heineman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Neb.
2013).
206.
Id. at 1280. The irrigators argued that the Bureau had a duty to control the state
“under certain repayment contracts regarding reclamation projects and federal reservoirs.”
Id. at 1281.
207.
Id. The McCarran Amendment provided no solace, as this was not a GSA, and neither did the Quiet Title Act nor other alleged waivers. Id. at 1080.
208.
Id.
209.
Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Neb. 2017).
210.
Id.
211.
Id. at 217 (discussing Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015)).
212.
Id. at 215 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92, 106–108 (1938)).
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213

preme Court. On the Rio Grande, by contrast, the United States
recognized that the dispute between Texas and New Mexico had
significant implications for federal interests and willingly subjected
214
itself to the original action.
C. Missed Opportunities for Constructive Federal Involvement
When both federal and state prerogatives are at stake, one would
expect to see at least some appetite, if not outright enthusiasm, for
215
interstate-federal compacts. Although the Council of State Governments got on board in the mid-twentieth century, some critics
“objected sharply” to extending federal participation in river basin
development through multi-party compacts. Others voiced concern that such compacts would improperly delegate federal administrative and regulatory duties to a compact commission “on which
216
the federal representative is in the minority.” As a result, examples are few and far between.
The Delaware River Basin Compact is one of those rare exam217
ples. Its origin story springs from a Supreme Court decree, a dev218
astating flood, and a handful of committed proponents. The
Compact Commission claims that its creation in 1961 “marked the
first time since the nation’s birth that the federal government and
a group of states joined together as equal partners in river basin
219
planning, development, and regulatory agency.” It is unique not
only from the standpoint of federal engagement as an equal part-

213.
Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation Dist. Heineman, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 1280–1281
(D. Neb. 2013). For commentary on how “interstate lawsuits derive essentially from deeper
conflicts rooted in the clash between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities,” see Burke Griggs, The Political Cultures of Irrigation and the Proxy Battles of Interstate Water
Litigation, 57 NAT. RES. J. 1 (2017).
214.
See Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 957–958 (2018).
215.
Frank P. Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-Operative Federalism, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 825, 839 (1963).
216.
Id. at 846. Grad warns that state members of a compact commission will sacrifice the
national interest to their own “particularistic interests.” Id.
217.
Public Law 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (Sept. 27, 1961).
218.
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1997). Hasday notes, pointing to the Delaware River Basic Compact as an example, that “all compact agencies with real authority sprang from unusual circumstances and pure chance.” Id. (citing MARTHA DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE & NATION:
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 192 (1974)).
219.
About DRBC, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM’N, https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/
(last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
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220

ner, but also due to its comprehensive coverage of both water al221
location and water quality.
By contrast, the Missouri River Basin Compact, which was proposed in 1953 in the wake of catastrophic flooding, is an example
222
of a failed federal-interstate compact. It was mothballed in 1955
when the states walked away from the table. Interests are exceptionally diverse in the basin. There are nine interested states, along
with as many as thirty Indian tribes, raising potentially prohibitive
223
transaction costs and cultural divides. Relatively few stakeholders
are interested in appropriations of water for consumption while
many are interested in maintaining the flow in different portions
of the system for vastly different purposes.
The Flood Control Act of 1944, which was at issue in the ACF lit224
igation, also undergirds the law of the Missouri River. As with the
ACF, the Act delegates decision-making over water uses and
streamflows to the Corps, which can make independent decisions
to allocate water to project purposes without engaging in meaning225
ful consultation with states and tribes. As a result, “there is an absence of a strong sense that the waters of the basin ‘are intercon226
nected and part of a single hydrologic system.’” John Davidson
explains:
[T]he Corps has been piecing decisions together in an ad
hoc manner, in effect an informal system of de facto allocations and reallocations made possible by the abundance of
flows. . . . Over the decades, the Corps has, in increments,
been passing water downstream in the Missouri River Basin
in response to increased demand there for groundwater irrigation, power plant cooling, and municipal and industrial

220.
Even before the Compact, federal involvement was key. The Supreme Court decree
appointed a federal “River Master”—the Chief Engineer of the U.S. Geological Survey—to
ensure implementation. Grad, supra note 189, at 845.
221.
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the
Struggle Over the ‘Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 828, 845 (2005). For analysis of federal involvement in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Compact, see Noah D. Hall & Benjamin Houston, Law and Governance of the Great Lakes, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 746 (2014).
222.
Grad, supra note 189, at 839 (citing HENRY C. HART, THE DARK MISSOURI 204–06
(1957)).
223.
Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 305, 359 (2004).
224.
See supra Part II.B; see also In re: MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d
1160, 1191 n. 25 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing the role of the Flood Control Act in ACF operations).
225.
See John H. Davidson, De Facto Allocation of Missouri River Water: The Emergence of Legal
Process, ABA WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Section of Env’t, Energy, & Res.,
Chicago, IL), March 2018, at 12.
226.
John H. Davidson, Missouri River Reservoirs in a Century of Climate Change: National or
Local Resource?, 20 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 2, 20 (2014) (citation omitted).
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(M&I) uses. When a new downstream use is accommodated, however, the user becomes reliant and the river is effectively reallocated to support the use . . . without consideration of possible upstream claims of states and Indian
227
tribes.
Davidson concludes that “[c]onflict in the Missouri River Basin . . . likely cannot be resolved by the usual avenues of compact or judi228
cial decree.” Absent a compact, litigation under the FCA and other
federal statutes presents an alternative, yet it ultimately leaves wa229
ter-related decision-making in the hands of the Corps. Indeed,
disgruntled stakeholders have brought an arsenal of statutory and
takings claims against the Corps, the Bureau, and other federal
agencies, as discussed in the next Part.
IV. IMMUNITY WAIVERS DRAG THE UNITED STATES TO THE
DANCE IN THE LOWER COURTS
Although the United States cannot be forced to participate in
state versus state actions before the U.S. Supreme Court, there are
a variety of situations where it can be haled into the lower courts.
In addition to the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of federal sovereign immunity for GSAs in state courts, Congress has waived immunity for actions brought under the Administrative Procedure
230
231
232
Act, many environmental statutes, and the Tucker Act. The
irony becomes apparent when we look at federal reserved rights on
the Milk River, and lawsuits against the United States on the Platte,
the Missouri, and the Klamath Rivers, all of which have had immense implications for water management as well as for sovereignty, federalism, and the judiciary.
A. Federal Reserved Rights and McCarran Amendment Waivers
The story of the Milk River Basin includes international, tribal,
and intrastate chapters. For water law aficionados, the Milk is familiar as the birthplace of the Winters Doctrine, which first recognized

227.
Davidson, supra note 225 (citation omitted).
228.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
229.
See id.
230.
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
231.
See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012); Clean Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012).
232.
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012).
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233

reserved rights for federal Indian reservations. The federal government can be found at the confluence of this doctrine and related controversies, going back well over a century.
The Milk River arises on the Blackfeet Reservation within the
state of Montana, where it is supplemented with water from the St.
Mary River as part of the Milk River Reclamation Project, approved
234
in 1903 by the newly minted U.S. Reclamation Service. The St.
Mary leaves the United States and runs through Alberta, while the
Milk River leaves the United States but, after traversing Alberta and
Saskatchewan for some 200 miles, it turns south again, where it
eventually joins the Missouri River below Fort Peck Dam. Before
reaching the Missouri, the Milk flows past three Indian reservations
and two National Wildlife Refuges, along the way providing water
to eight irrigation districts, one of which is operated by the U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). As Barbara Cosens noted, this
makes one heck of a “jurisdictional morass.” 235 At the turn of the
last century, two significant legal developments arose in the Milk
River Basin. The first has an international dimension; the second
involves federal, tribal, and state interests.
On the international chapter, a dispute over the St. Mary diversion provided the impetus for the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
236
between Great Britain (for Canada) and the United States. When
the United States began to divert water from the St. Mary into the
Milk River, indignant Albertans took matters into their own hands,
lining up bulldozers on the Canadian side of the border and digging a “Spite Canal” to demonstrate their ability to divert the water
237
back to the St. Mary River.
Pursuant to Article VI of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the International Joint Commission (IJC) issued an order distributing the
waters of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers between the United States
238
and Canada. Canada has not yet developed its full share and the

233.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
234.
Barbara Cosens, Water Dispute Resolution in the West: Process Elements for the Modern Era
in Basin-Wide Problem Solving, 33 ENVTL . L. 949, 956 (2003).
235.
Id.
236.
Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada. U.K.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
237.
Nigel Banks and Elizabeth Bourget, Apportionment of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers, in
WATER WITHOUT BORDERS 163 (2013); Mary Ellen Wolfe, The Milk River: Deferred Water Policy
Transitions in an International Waterway, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55 (1992).
238.
Int’l Joint Comm’n [IJC], In the Matter of the Measurement and Apportionment of
the Waters of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers and Their Tributaries in the United States and
Canada, (Oct. 6, 1921), available at http://www.ijc.org-/php/publications/pdf/ID52.pdf.
The two countries agreed to share the rivers equitably, with Alberta taking a larger share of
the St. Mary and Montana taking a larger share of the Milk. B. Timothy Heinmiller, The
Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-U.S. Relations in Abundance and Scarcity, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1499, 1507 (2008).
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potential for “a simmering international conflict” still exists “de239
spite the IJC’s best efforts to manage it over the past century.”
Around the same time as the Spite Canal incident, the federalstate-tribal chapter over appropriations from the Milk River was being written, ultimately spawning the doctrine of reserved rights in
240
Winters v. United States. In the 1888 treaty creating Fort Belknap
Reservation, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine tribes ceded their
rights to a much larger portion of land in exchange for the United
States’ creation of a “permanent home and abiding place” within
241
Montana. Although the treaty was silent with respect to water,
prior to the treaty, “[t]he Indians had command of the lands and
242
the waters, [and] of all their beneficial use . . . .” The Supreme
Court found that the treaty lands were “practically valueless” without water, and that the tribes would not have agreed to a treaty
that failed to provide water; therefore, sufficient water for their
243
survival had been implicitly reserved. This meant that appropriators with legally recognized water rights under Montana state law
244
were enjoined from interfering with the flow into Fort Belknap.
Despite damage to the upstream appropriators’ investments and
245
the affront to state sovereignty, the Court insisted that “[t]he
power of the [federal] [g]overnment to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied,
246
and could not be.”
Much more recently, after decades of litigation and negotiations, the United States, the State of Montana, and the Blackfeet
Tribe concluded a settlement of water rights for the Milk, memori247
alized in the Blackfeet-Montana Water Rights Compact of 2009.

239.
Id. at 1520. Montana has sought IJC review of the St. Mary-Milk apportionment several times. Id. at 1519.
240.
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
241.
207 U.S. at 565-68. The Fort Belknap, Blackfeet, and Fort Peck reservations were
carved out of a much larger reservation that had encompassed the entire Milk River Basin in
the U.S. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
242.
Id. at 576.
243.
Id. at 577.
244.
Id. at 565, 578. For background on the Winters case, see Justin Huber and Sandra
Zellmer, The Shallows Where Federal Reserved Water Rights Founder: State Court Derogation of the
Winters Doctrine, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 261 (2013).
245.
Winters, 207 U.S. at 569–70, 576–78 (State appropriators alleged that they had invested more than $100,000 and that “[i]f they [were] deprived of waters ‘their lands [would]
be ruined, it [would] be necessary to abandon their homes, and they [would] be greatly and
irreparably damaged.’”).
246.
Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
247.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-1501. For details, see Montana DNRC, Blackfeet Compact,
http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/reserved-water-rights-compact-commission/blackfeet-tribecompact (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). A separate compact with the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine for the Fort Belknap Reservation has been adopted and was introduced to Congress
in 2011, but Congress has not yet acted. Mont. Code Ann. 85-20-1001. For details, see Mon-
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Congress took nearly a decade, but eventually passed the Blackfeet Settlement Act of 2016, which, at $422 million, is one of the
largest federal allocations in an Indian reserved rights settlement
248
to date.
This landmark agreement is expected to resolve some of the
249
thorny intrastate issues that remained in the wake of Winters. At
least two unique factors paved the way. First, by agreeing to provide
funding for the settlement, Congress played a significant role in its
250
completion. For its part, Montana took a proactive step by commencing general stream adjudications in every basin of the state,
251
with a target date of 2028 for entering final decrees. In effect, the
state committed itself to settling federal reserved rights through
252
negotiation rather than litigation.
The state could have tied up federal reserved rights, including
Fort Belknap’s, in state court under the McCarran Amendment’s
253
waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Situating these important
federal rights in a state forum could have jeopardized both nation254
255
al and tribal interests. In addition to judicial bias, GSAs are no256
torious for their “inefficiency and interminability.” They are so

tana DNRC, Fort Belknap Compact, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/reserved-water-rightscompact-commission/fort-belknap-indian-reservation-compact (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
248.
Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, §§
3701-3724, 130 Stat 1628 (Dec. 16, 2016); see CONG. RES. SERV., INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
SETTLEMENTS 6–8 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44148.pdf (table listing “Enacted
Indian Water Rights Settlements” by state and tribe).
249.
See A. DAN TARLOCK, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS—INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
SETTLEMENTS—OFF-RESERVATION AND INSTREAM USES, § 9:48 (2019) (noting that, under the
agreement, the Blackfeet Tribe “can continue to use its historic Winters rights in the Milk
River, but can only initiate new uses authorized in the Compact or through processes specified in the Compact”); Aubrey Ryan Bertram, Western States Water Conference and Native American Rights Fund 15th Biennial Symposium on the Settlement of Indian Reserved Water Rights Claims,
21 U. OF DENV. WATER L. REV. 119, 120 (2017) (explaining that, although the agreement
reserves tribal rights to surface and groundwater within the boundaries of the reservation,
“previously established state rights on a few rivers that support irrigation in highly profitable
agricultural lands . . . are protected from calls by the Tribe”).
250.
Bertram, supra note 249, at 121. The Congressional Research Service reports that,
“as of 2019, 36 Indian water rights settlements had been federally approved, with total costs
in excess of $5.8 billion.” See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 248, at 2. Efficiency, fairness, and
durability require greater involvement by the U.S. in Indian water rights settlements. See Cosens, supra note 234, at 1017–18. However, the lack of federal funds to implement ongoing
and future agreements is a significant challenge. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 248, at
2.
251.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-212.
252.
Michelle Bryan, At the End of the Day: Are the West’s General Stream Adjudications Relevant to Modern Water Rights Administration?, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 461, 462 (2015).
253.
43 U.S.C. § 666(a). See supra notes 100–05.
254.
Huber & Zellmer, supra note 244, at 276, 278.
255.
Id. at 282–287 (providing examples).
256.
Jamison E. Colburn, Don’t Go in the Water: On Pathological Jurisdiction Splitting
19 (Feb. 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3343705.
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expensive, lengthy, and unpredictable that claimants are driven to
257
settling disputes out of court at almost any cost. GSA disputes,
especially those involving federal interests, “have yielded a unique258
ly chaotic jurisdictional landscape.” As Professor Tarlock argued
decades ago, as modes of dispute resolution, GSAs “were barely fit
to a distant past and completely unfit for the hand-to-hand com259
bat” of modern water rights disputes.
GSAs do hold promise, however, for requiring federal involvement in disputes where federal actions have immense effect but
where other avenues to force the United States to court are lim260
ited. For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court seems convinced that
the federal interest in protecting its water rights and in avoiding
piecemeal litigation can be adequately protected by state courts
261
complemented by the Court’s own certiorari jurisdiction.
B. Waivers of Immunity in Federal Regulatory Cases
Two rivers in the country’s midsection illustrate the depth and
breadth of federal participation in regulatory cases. Waivers of sovereign immunity can be found in the APA, the ESA, and other fed262
eral environmental statutes.
The Platte River was the venue for the first major battle between
water rights and the ESA when, in Dan Tarlock’s words, “Nebraska
discovered that downstream irrigators could be better protected
under the wing of the endangered whooping crane” than by a
263
compact or equitable apportionment. Nebraska sought to enjoin
construction of a dam on the North Platte in Wyoming, using the
regulatory hook of the ESA to achieve its purpose: protecting
downstream agricultural diversions. As Tarlock explains, “it proved
easier to get water for this purpose than to reopen a 1945 equitable

257.
Id. at 24. See, e.g., Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication That Ate Arizona Water Law, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 405 (2007) (describing the decades-long Gila River Adjudication).
258.
Colburn, supra note 256, at 20.
259.
Id. at 24 (citing A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finality in General Water Rights Adjudications, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 271, 284 (1988)).
260.
See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use the Gila River Sys. & Source,
989 P.2d 739, 745–49 (Ariz. 1999); United States v. City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo.
1982).
261.
Colburn, supra note 256, at 21–24 (citing Ariz. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S.
545, 564 (1983)); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812-18
(1976)).
262.
See supra Part I.C.
263.
A. Dan Tarlock & Jason Robison, Federal Regulatory Rights, L. OF WATER RIGHTS &
RES. § 9:32 (2018).
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264

apportionment . . . .” A settlement was reached that benefited
both the whooping crane and Nebraska irrigators, with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Rural Electrification Admin265
istration, and the Corps playing a major role in its resolution.
The Missouri River features prominently in this Section and Section C, too. As the longest river in North America, the Missouri
travels 2,600 miles from its source in Montana to its mouth near St.
Louis, draining over 500,000 square miles of land in ten states and
one Canadian province. The upper and lower basin states have
wildly divergent interests, ranging from water supply and reservoir
recreation in the upper basin to navigation and river recreation in
266
the lower basin. The states do, however, have a common con267
cern: flood control. Yet they “have proved consistently incapable
268
of joint action.”
269
With the Flood Control Act of 1944, Congress provided the
Missouri River Basin states with some relief from flooding. It gave
the Corps control over six mainstem dams and reservoirs for flood
control and navigation purposes, and authorized the Bureau of
Reclamation to promote irrigation through projects on the tribu270
271
taries. Like the ACF, the Missouri River system is regulated by
the Corps’ Master Water Control Manual and Annual Operating
272
Plans.
In the 1990s, it became clear that operations-as-usual were
273
wreaking havoc on the Missouri River ecosystem. Faced with
threats to ESA-listed species (pallid sturgeon, least interior tern,
and piping plover), the Corps revised its Master Manual for the system in 2004 in an effort to comply with both the authorized pur264.
Id. Nebraska took the latter path in Nebraska v. Wyoming, No. 108 (1987). The
Court acknowledged that it would consider environmental harm in deciding whether to enjoin proposed water projects in Wyoming, but only if Nebraska could show substantial injury. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 12 (1995).
265.
See Nebraska v. Rural Elec. Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994); Platte River
Whooping Crane Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Nebraska v. Rural Elec. Admin., 12 E.R.C. 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
266.
Sandra B. Zellmer, Mudslinging on the Missouri: Can Endangered Species Survive the
Clean Water Act?, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 89, 92–94 (2011); JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF
PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 185 (1994).
267.
Davidson, supra note 226, at 12.
268.
Id. at 8.
269.
Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (codified as
amended in U.S.C. titles 16, 33, and 43).
270.
Id.
271.
See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 144 (1902); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46,
117–118; Grant, supra note 124.
272.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MISSOURI RIVER MAINSTEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM
MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL (2018), https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/
collection/p266001coll1/id/8200.
273.
See, e.g., Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 654, 667 (2018); Am. Rivers v. Corps, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (D.D.C. 2003).
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poses of the Flood Control Act and the jeopardy-avoiding measures
274
specified in a biological opinion. The Corps had previously attempted to shield itself from judicial review by arguing that its operating decisions were “committed to agency discretion,” but the
Eighth Circuit held that the Master Manual was binding and there275
fore reviewable. As a result, the Corps was ordered to attempt to
reconcile its duties under both the ESA and the Flood Control Act,
despite the likelihood that actions that benefited imperiled species
276
would undermine the flood control mission and vice versa.
C. Waivers of Immunity in Takings Cases
The Corps’ operational approach on the Missouri River was put
to the test soon after its 2004 Master Manual was signed. Floods
caused property damage in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2013, and 2014. But
the Corps’ ability to meet the requirements of both the FCA and
the ESA was most severely tested in 2011, when the basin experienced unprecedented amounts of precipitation and snowmelt.
That spring brought the highest runoff volume since 1898—148%
higher than the historical median—requiring record releases from
277
the reservoirs. Although the Missouri River reservoir system is the
largest in the United States, with about 73 million acre-feet of storage capacity, it was not enough to hold back the floodwaters.
Downstream, floodwater carved fifty-foot deep gouges in the land
and amassed sand dunes up to fifteen feet high, some of which are
278
still present on farm fields.
Some four hundred landowners and two Indian tribes sued the
Corps for Fifth Amendment takings in Ideker Farms v. United
279
States. They alleged that the Corps damaged their property by
mismanaging the system in order to prioritize listed species over
people. Although the claims are couched in the language of negligence (duty, breach, causation, and damages), plaintiffs sued for
274.
See In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1175 (D. Minn.
2004). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that the Corps had discretion to determine
how best to fulfill the purposes of both statutes. In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421
F.3d 618, 631 (8th Cir. 2005).
275.
South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1027–30 (8th Cir. 2003).
276.
See id. at 1019 (noting that “[i]n good times, the Corps can accommodate all such
[competing] interests, but, when facing a continuous drought, the Corps is forced to make
hard choices”); In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (describing
the “insurmountable task” of balancing “all competing river interests regardless of the
weather, while simultaneously protecting and preserving the environment and the species it
harbors”).
277.
Zellmer, supra note 112, at 197.
278.
Id. at 198.
279.
Ideker Farms, 136 Fed. Cl. at 654.
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takings rather than torts, because—like equitable apportionment
or compact litigation before the Supreme Court—tort claims
against the U.S. for its flood control acts or omissions are barred by
280
sovereign immunity.
The litigation was bifurcated, with Phase I utilizing forty-four
281
“bellwether” plaintiffs for purposes of determining liability. After
a lengthy trial, Judge Firestone found that some of the plaintiffs
had shown that their damages during some (but not all) of the
multi-year floods were the “direct and natural consequence of the
cumulative and combined effects of the System and River Changes
282
taken by the Corps to meet its ESA obligations.” However, the
court determined that flooding in 2011 was not attributable to the
Master Manual’s ESA-related priorities. Rather, excessive inflows
simply exceeded the amount of storage available in the reser283
voirs. Phase II of the Ideker Farms case will determine the amount
284
of compensation due to each of the successful plaintiffs.
Similar litigation dynamics were at play in the Klamath River basin with respect to takings claims arising from federal operations.
There, irrigators in California and Oregon claimed that, by halting
water deliveries in 2001 in order to preserve habitat for listed fish
species and to comply with its trust obligation to tribes, the Bureau
of Reclamation took their state-sanctioned water rights and also
285
impaired their rights in violation of the Klamath Basin Compact.
The court concluded that the irrigators’ rights were subservient to
the prior interests of the U.S. and the tribes, reasoning that tribal
reserved rights held a priority date of time immemorial. Under established principles of prior appropriation, junior irrigators have
no right to take water needed to fulfill the tribes’ senior rights to
286
instream flows for treaty-protected fish. Because it expressly pre-

280.
See supra notes 108–09 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 702(c)); United States v. James, 478 U.S.
597, 602–03 (1986) (explaining the trade-offs that led to the Flood Control Act of 1928,
whereby Congress would undertake the costs of a major public works program but not the
tort liability that may be caused by it).
281.
Ideker Farms, 136 Fed. Cl. at 659.
282.
Id. at 678. Ideker Farms, for example, will be allowed to proceed to Phase II with
respect to flood damages experienced in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2013, and 2014. Id. at 762.
283.
Id. at 693. During the 2011 flood, operations for any other purpose than flood control (including ESA purposes) were suspended. Thus, “the court cannot find that ‘but for’
the new Master Manual, the Corps would have begun to make releases from the dams earlier and could have avoided the 160,000 cfs releases that resulted in devastating flooding in
2011.” Id. at 692–693.
284.
Id. at 660. Phase II will also resolve any defenses raised by the United States. Id.
285.
Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 510 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The
litigation has spanned sixteen years, multiple opinions, an appeal to the Federal Circuit, a
diversion to the Oregon Supreme Court on a certified question of law, and a lengthy trial.
For the latest chapter, see Baley v. United States 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (2017).
286.
Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 678–79.
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served tribal rights, the compact between California and Oregon
287
did not alter this analysis.
The court subsequently held that the irrigators’ decision to
bring takings claims for losses incurred due to ESA-mandated
measures required the irrigators to proceed “on the assumption
288
that the administrative action was both authorized and lawful.”
The Klamath River irrigators at least had their day in court, which
they would not have had if their respective states had attempted to
289
bring compact-related claims against the United States.
V. CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
There are two potentially viable solutions to the federal sovereign immunity problem. First, the executive branch could encourage ad hoc immunity waivers for original actions between states by
executive order or other means. Such waivers would then occur on
a case-by-case basis within the Department of Justice’s existing liti290
gation discretion. This authority, which is often described as ple291
nary, is subject to few constraints. Any solution that relies on discretionary immunity waivers would lead to uncertainty among the
292
parties and unpredictable, possibly inequitable, results.
287.
Id. at 680; see id. at 635 (citing Pub. L. No. 85–222, 71 Stat. 497 (1957) (“Nothing in
this compact shall be deemed . . . [t]o deprive any individual Indian, tribe, band or community of Indians of any rights, privileges, or immunities afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement or statute.”).
288.
Id. at 674 (citing Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
289.
See supra Part III.
290.
See 28 U.S.C. 516 (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”).
291.
See, e.g., United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 571 F.2d
1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978) (describing the authority to supervise litigation involving federal
agencies as extremely broad, including authority to agree to a dismissal of actions brought
by the government); United States v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 847 F. Supp.
1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 28 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1107 (1995) (holding that the Attorney General could maintain the United States’
breach of contract and state law claims against a local water district, and ultimately enter
into a settlement, without concurrence of other federal agencies due to Attorney General’s
general authority to conduct and supervise litigation where the United States is a party);
The Attorney Gen.’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. O.L.C. 47, 62
(1982), https://www.justice.gov/file/22896/download (stating that the “full plenary authority” of the Attorney General, as chief litigation officer for the U.S., embraces all aspects of
litigation, including subpoena enforcement, prosecutions, defenses, and settlements, constrained only by other Acts of Congress and the Executive’s constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the laws).
292.
See generally Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power: Why Congress
Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 329 (2009)
(describing “innumerable ways in which the Department’s control over the litigation on be-
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Second, and more effective, would be a congressional waiver
of federal sovereign immunity for water allocation original actions
between states. Congress could include a waiver in its consent legis293
lation for each and every new water compact. However, given the
limited number of new interstate compacts adopted in recent
years, this pathway would have limited effect, and would do nothing to resolve disputes over existing compacts or equitable appor294
tionment.
Instead, Congress should enact a sweeping waiver for all water
allocation original action cases between states, whether the cases
originate as compact disputes or equitable apportionment litiga295
tion. A newly enacted waiver provision should replace subsection
296
(c) of the McCarran Amendment, which otherwise shields the
federal government from original actions “involving the right of
297
States to the use of the water of any interstate stream.”
By way of example, Congress included a broad waiver of immun298
ity in legislation governing the Colorado River in 1956, as an
299
amendment to the 1922 Colorado River Compact. The provision
reads as follows:
In the operation and maintenance of all facilities, authorized by Federal law and under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, in the basin of the
Colorado River, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to
comply with the applicable provisions of the Colorado Riv-

half of the United States gives it the opportunity to respect or to evade the authority allocated so carefully by the Constitution”).
293.
Marilyn O’Leary, Reinventing the Interstate Water Compact: A New Model, 52 RMMLFINST 21-1 (2006).
294.
Id.
295.
Jerome C. Muys, Jr. & George William Sherk, The Dogmas of the Quiet Past: Potential
Climate Change Impacts on Interstate Compact Water Allocation, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 315
(2016). Any concerns over retroactive application of such a provision to pre-existing interstate compacts should be alleviated by the consent language of most of those compacts, in
which Congress reserved the right to alter, amend, or repeal the legislation. O’Leary, supra
note 293, at § 21.03 n.12.
296.
43 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1996).
297.
See supra notes 106–07 (discussing 43 U.S.C. § 666(c)); O’Leary, supra note 293 (arguing that § 666(c) be repealed); Sara Franklin, Rebekah King, The Nineteenth Annual Water
Law Conference Watershed Management: A New Governance Trend, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 539,
546 (2001) (conveying Jerome Muys’ recommendations that § 666(c) be repealed so that
the United States gets more involved in equitable apportionment cases “[t]o negate the Supreme Court’s lack of watershed management and protection consideration within [such]
cases . . . especially for the purpose of the administration and oversight of comprehensive
regulatory programs that largely impact water rights”).
298.
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2012) (authorizing construction of Hoover Dam); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Arizona II) (finding that
the Boulder Canyon Project Act divided the lower basin’s share of the river).
299.
43 U.S.C. § 620m.
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er Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the
Boulder Canyon Project Act . . . and the Treaty with the
United Mexican States, in the storage and release of water
from reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin. In the event of
the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to so comply, any State of
the Colorado River Basin may maintain an action in the Supreme
Court of the United States to enforce the provisions of this section,
and consent is given to the joinder of the United States as a party
300
in such suit or suits, as a defendant or otherwise.
This waiver was passed some years after Arizona had been
thwarted in its attempt to bring an original action against Califor301
nia for apportionment of Colorado River water. The Court denied Arizona’s petition for leave to file the complaint because the
United States—an indispensable party due to its pervasive authority to control navigation and surplus water on the river—was not a
302
party to the suit.
The unique history of Colorado River Basin development provides additional reasons for the waiver of federal immunity. Because the basin states were utterly incapable of reaching negotiated
solutions for water allocation, and because they accepted “massive
federal charity” in the form of reclamation dams and related infrastructure, when Congress authorized project construction in the
303
Boulder Canyon Act, it vested authority for allocating and man304
aging flows in the federal government. Importantly, by construing the Act as bestowing the mantle of “river master” on the De305
partment of Interior in Arizona v. California II, the Supreme
Court “enlisted a new institution . . . and in the process, took a very
306
fragmented system and made it a much more holistic system.”
This is not to say that Colorado River governance is perfect, but
it does serve as an example where extensive federal involvement
and a federal waiver of immunity go hand in hand to foster rela-

300.
Id. (emphasis added).
301.
See Larson, supra note 118, at 917–18 (noting that, when crews from California
crossed into Arizona territory while attempting to build a dam on the Colorado River, thenSecretary of Interior Harold Ickes halted the construction to avoid a violent confrontation
between the two states, and remarking that “protecting and developing these shared resources under the cloud of interjurisdictional politics is one of the most formidable governance challenges in the United States”).
302.
Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 569–70, 572 (1936) (Arizona I).
303.
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (2012).
304.
See David H. Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing Federal Authority as an Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 573, 575 (1997).
305.
Arizona v. California (Arizona II), 373 U.S. 546, 590 (1963).
306.
Barton H. Thompson, The Role of the Courts in Water Law, 66 S.C. L. REV. 581, 589
(2015).
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tively comprehensive river governance. As the late David Getches
observed, exhibiting his characteristic realism and optimism:
Though the legal arrangements made early in the century
to allocate Colorado River water may seem imperfect and
incomplete, it is not necessary to revamp them in order to
satisfy today’s values and demands. The law of the river has
evolved: a broad realm of policies addressing water quality,
endangered species, and recreation temper the early preoccupation with consumptive uses. These statutory additions to the law of the river call for a more integrated consideration of resource values. 307
In the Colorado River basin, the convergence of a clear federal
role and the assurance of federal accountability through the congressional immunity waiver are facilitating negotiated solutions to a
range of issues from endangered species and water quality to pub308
lic lands management. For one thing, a broad coalition of stakeholders advises the Secretary on operating policies for Glen Canyon Dam to balance environmental, hydropower, and recreational
309
interests. For another, recent proposals to reallocate and to deliver Colorado River water to more efficient, high value uses and
users, such as Indian tribes, through market mechanisms like water
310
banks, have shown some promise. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation, the states, and the irrigation districts continue to work
311
on, and to improve, salinity control measures. None of these initiatives would be likely to occur, much less to take root and sprout
equitable, durable solutions absent strong federal leadership and a

307.
Getches, supra note 304, at 577. Professor Getches acknowledged that “the time is
ripe to encourage broadly inclusive, participatory problem-solving in the Colorado River
basin,” id. at 579–80, but warned not to throw out the baby with the bathwater, as current
governance structures can serve present and future needs. Other scholars have argued that
the Colorado River Compact and associated “Law of the River” “may not contain sufficient
flexibility to address the magnitude of changes in scientific knowledge and understanding,
social and political views and forces, and physical circumstances that have occurred since
1922.” Robert W. Adler, Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a Change?, 28 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 22 (2008).
308.
Getches, supra note 304, at 580; see also Thompson, supra note 306, at 588 (“In its
Court-designated role as water-master for the Colorado River, the Department of the Interior . . . has been able to continue to help resolve the disputes that inevitably arise over interstate waters.”).
309.
Getches, supra note 304, at 597. In the wake of the Grand Canyon Protection Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1804, 106 Stat. 4669, requiring that the Secretary operate Glen
Canyon dam to protect Grand Canyon National Park, the Secretary constituted a multi-party
Adaptive Management Work Group to assist in coordinating technical data, to recommend
adjustments in dam operations, and to monitor progress. Id. at 627.
310.
Id. at 580, 605–09, 613–19.
311.
Cf. id. at 604–05.
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means of holding the federal government responsible through a
waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Colorado River is unique in some respects, but it is not so
unique that the lessons learned from its management cannot be
312
extended to other basins. The United States is duty-bound to ensure that federal environmental and natural resources laws are implemented across interstate boundaries. When resource-related
disputes between states arise, the states should have the opportunity to demonstrate that federal actions may have an impact on their
interests, especially when it comes to Supreme Court decrees and
313
congressionally approved allocations..
Beyond the Colorado River, Congress has adopted a number of
statutes consenting to suit against the United States in original ac314
tions brought by states. The Supreme Court seems to have no
315
qualms over the validity of these provisions.
CONCLUSION
In the modern era, with heightened demand for water supply,
extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change, and ever
more pressing ecological needs, one will almost always find the
federal government in the thick of interstate disputes over interstate waters and other important resources. Consequently, as
Jamison Colburn laments, “ping-ponging between state and federal
forums—which had once seemed a remote and dystopic prospect—may well become the norm given the jurisdictional posture
of so many water rights, the abundance of ‘project water’ throughout the West, and the crisscross of jurisdictional lanes for adjudi316
cating these claims.”
The destructive nature of federal disengagement in interstate
water disputes is palpable. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the Bureau of Reclamation “have become the pivotal and domi-

312.
See O’Leary, supra note 293, at § 21.03 (“There is no reason why a similar waiver
should not be included in congressional consent legislation for all interstate compacts.”).
313.
See id.
314.
See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 615vv, 1551(c).
315.
See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 90–93 (1969) (applying a provision designed to resolve disputes between the US and Utah over ownership of the Great Salt Lake,
80 Stat. 192, as amended, 80 Stat. 349, which both authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
issue a quitclaim deed to Utah for the federal interest in the lake properties and provided a
mechanism by which the fair value of the federal interest could be set); California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65, 68 (1979) (construing a statutory waiver of federal immunity in quiet
title actions in federal district courts to authorize original actions in the Supreme Court).
316.
Colburn, supra note 256, at 45–46.
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317

nant actors in interstate river basins.” Unless these agencies can
be brought to court and bound by judicial decrees, states and other affected parties will not be able to obtain complete relief over,
and management of, essential resources.
Both state and federal sovereignty, and the public interest represented by both governments, weigh in favor of more regular and
predictable federal involvement in interstate water disputes. Recent scholarship by Professor Benson, who once skillfully debunked the myth of unflagging federal deference to states in the
318
water rights arena, hits the mark. “Whatever else might be said
about American water federalism, most observers would likely
agree that the federal government should normally support a
state’s water management priorities. And if a federal agency is going to frustrate a key state goal, it should be necessary to serve an
319
important national interest.” If federal agencies cannot be sued,
courts cannot assess and weigh the national interest against the
states’ priorities, and they cannot issue appropriate, equitable
remedies.
Solving wicked problems over scarce transboundary resources
will require a congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
Congress has expansive power over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, subject to the “cases and controversies” requirement of Article III and other constitutional constraints that preserve separa320
tion of powers and individual rights. Waiving federal immunity
for original actions in the U.S. Supreme Court poses no threat to
the integrity of the judiciary, which is well suited to hearing federal-interstate controversies over natural resources.
There is already a trend away from federal immunity; this proposal simply expands on that trend. “Over the past 150 years, Congress has gradually and sometimes haltingly, but with progressive
expansiveness and generosity, lowered the shield of federal sover321
eign immunity.” Congress should exhibit “progressive expansiveness and generosity” now, by lowering the shield with respect to
original actions between the states over interstate water resources
where the federal government is a necessary party.

317.
Griggs, supra note 1, at 210–211.
318.
Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth, supra note 5, at 242.
319.
Benson, supra note 4, at 405. Benson observes that resolution of interstate water
wars may require Congress to waive federal immunity, “at least on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at
405 n. 242.
320.
Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 249, 262.
321.
Sisk, supra note 39, at 605.

